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Abstract. Smart environments are becoming ubiquitous despite many
potential security and privacy issues. But, do people understand what
consequences could arise from using smart environments? To answer this
research question, we conducted a survey with 575 participants from three
different countries (Germany, Spain, Romania) considering smart home
and health environments. Less than half of all participants mentioned
at least one security and privacy issue, with significantly more German
participants mentioning issues than the Spanish ones and the Spanish
participants in turn mentioning significantly more security and privacy
issues than the Romanian participants. Using open coding, we find that
among the 275 participants mentioning security and privacy issues, 111
only expressed abstract concerns such as “security issues” and only 34
mentioned concrete harms such as “Burglaries (physical and privacy)”,
caused by security and privacy violations. The remaining 130 participants
who mentioned security and privacy issues named only threats (i.e. their
responses were more concrete than just abstract concerns but they did
not mention concrete harming scenarios).
1 Introduction
Smart environments are becoming increasingly popular for end users, with smart
homes reaching a household penetration of 9.5% worldwide in 2019 and an
expected increase to 22.1% by 2023 [21]. Smart environments offer a multitude of
possible applications, one of them being the assistance of elderly people or those
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suffering from a health impairment by equipping their households with connected
health devices (e.g., blood pressure monitors) and sensors (e.g., drop sensors) -
often referred to as smart health environments. However, such smart environments
of home and health applications also introduce potential security and privacy
issues [5,7,10,11,18]. While there is an increasing body of research on the security
and privacy vulnerabilities of smart environments (and how to address these
vulnerabilities), it remains an open question, to which extent end users are aware
of these issues. A number of studies investigating user perception of security and
privacy risks in smart environments have been conducted in the US, however,
less is known about users’ awareness in other countries. In this work we aim
to gain broader insights into this topic by conducting a large-scale qualitative
survey with 596 participants from three different countries (Germany, Romania,
Spain). These countries were chosen based on previous research conducted in
Europe, which showed different security and privacy conceptions for the southern,
northern, eastern, and western parts of Europe [6, 15].
We considered two examples of smart environments (smart home and smart
health). Smart homes as a smart environment which has been around for some
years already, have a larger user base and have been more present in the media
compared to smart health environments. On the other hand, smart health envi-
ronments could be considered as handling even more sensitive data than smart
homes. Moreover, we included both owners and non-owners of these environments
in our sample.
We find that less than half of the participants mentioned any security and
privacy issues in smart environments, and that most participants focused on
threats (e.g., data collection, monitoring, and data theft) or expressed abstract
concerns about their security and privacy. Only 34 out of 596 participants
described a potential harm caused by security and privacy violations that could
result from living in smart environments, such as being burgled, being influenced
in one’s behavior, or getting increased insurance rates. This suggests that most
participants lack a thorough understanding of how living in smart environments
could affect their lives. At the same time, our study has demonstrated significant
differences between the countries in terms of awareness about security and
privacy issues. As such, the German participants seem to be more aware of
security and privacy issues associated with smart environments than the Spanish
and Romanian participants, with 74% of them naming at least one security and
privacy issue compared to 44% of Spanish participants and 22% of Romanian
participants. Furthermore, the participants named more security and privacy
issues associated with smart homes than with smart health. This is alarming,
as particularly smart devices that are connected to the users’ body have the
potential to severely harm their health if these devices are compromised in a
cyber-attack. We discuss the implication of our findings, concluding the need
for taking the cultural context into account when designing measures for data
protection such as general awareness campaigns or services providing information
to the end users relevant for data protection.
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2 Background and Related Work
Although there are several studies on users’ awareness and perception of security
and privacy threats, in most of these studies participants were shown lists with
different threats and asked to evaluate these. Few researchers, however, asked
users to provide security and privacy threats on their own. Some studies e.g.,
Harbach et al. [9] or Stadion et al. [20] had a slightly different context in their
study and asked the participants about the dangers of the primary use of the
Internet. The participants could name only very few consequences and were
not aware of most of the possible ones. Similar studies e.g. Bellekens et al. [4],
Oomen and Leenes [17] or Aktypi et al. [1] with lists of various security and/or
privacy risks found that people are unaware of concrete privacy and security
risks and mainly worried about general privacy issues. In their study, Zeng
et al. [23] focused on the group of smart home users and their knowledge of
security and privacy threats. Unfortunately, the study comprises only very few
participants, and therefore the significance of the dissemination of the knowledge
of consequences is only limited here. Therefore, we have chosen the approach
of questioning both users and non-users within the framework of a large-scale
online study. Karwatzki et al. [12] had in their study 22 focus groups in which
they asked the participants about possible privacy consequences. Whereas this is
probably the most extensive study that has been conducted so far on people’s
awareness of privacy issues, Karwatzki et al. do not report how many participants
referred to a particular issue. Moreover, their participants mostly referred to
consequences that could arise from using online social networks, a well-established
technology, while we focus on two emerging technologies, i.e., smart home and
smart health environments. Garg [8] conducted a survey with 834 US-American
IoT users, of which 115 reported to no longer use IoT devices due to privacy
concerns. Another survey with experts and lay users [19] shows that if people
care about concrete security and privacy issues, these are often of a financial or
social nature, identifying identity theft, account breach, and job loss as the top
rated tech-related risk scenarios.
Further studies focused on influence of culture on security and privacy risk
perception. As such, Lancelot Miltgen et al. [15] conducted focus groups with
participants from seven EU countries. The countries were chosen based on
cultural differences and internet usage. Europe was divided into four major
blocks: Northern, Eastern, Western, and Southern Europe. The findings suggest
a difference between North and South with respect to responsibility versus trust.
Also, people in the Southern countries perceive data disclosure as a personal
choice, whereas people from Eastern countries feel forced to disclose personal
data. A study by Cecere et al. [6] relying on a data set collected in 2009 by the
EU Commission in 27 different European countries showed comparable outcomes
to Lancelot Miltgen et al. [15]. Northern and Eastern European countries seem to
be less concerned by potential misuse of personal data. People living in Southern
and Central Europe, at the same time, tend to be more worried about their
personal data. They explain their findings by the institutional legacy of former
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collectivistic countries. Eastern countries are seen as more collectivistic, therefore
are accustomed to government control, which reflects fewer privacy concerns.
3 Methodology
We conducted a qualitative survey with open answer questions to investigate
people’s understanding of potential security and privacy issues associated with
the use of two different instances of smart environments – namely smart home
and smart health environments – while considering people from different cultural
backgrounds (i.e., from Germany, Spain, and Romania).
3.1 Smart Environments
Smart environments are a rather broad area as this can be any environment with
any types of interconnected devices and sensors. We consider the transformation
of people’s homes into smart environments most relevant and thus decided to
focus on our research on these smart environments in people’s homes. Firstly, this
includes all classical smart home devices (ranging from smart TVs to other smart
household appliances, to various sensors e.g., for light and temperature) which
have been around for several years. Secondly, this also includes smart health
environments, i.e., equipping households with connected health devices (e.g.,
blood pressure monitors) and sensors (e.g., fall detectors) which are connected to
the attending physician and/or various health services. We consider it worthwhile
to study both of these smart environments, as (1) smart homes are likely to be
more frequently used, but also more discussed in the media compared to smart
health households; and (2) smart health data may be considered more sensitive
than smart home data, but also might bring more advantages as it helps saving
lives while smart homes are mainly for one’s convenience. All these different
characteristics might make a difference with respect to people’s awareness of
security and privacy issues.
We used the following definition of smart home and smart health devices for
our study considering descriptions from other researchers such as used in [2, 14]
while providing examples for the various types of connected devices:
A smart home is an environment in which household appliances (e.g.,
refrigerator, washing machine, vacuum cleaner), integrated devices (e.g., lights,
windows, heating) and entertainment electronics (e.g., TV, game consoles) are
networked and can be controlled via the Internet.
Smart health comprises health care devices (e.g., blood pressure monitors,
scales, thermometers) and special sensors (e.g., drop-sensors, sensors in the toilet,
heat sensors) which are connected to the Internet.
The actual descriptions used in the survey are provided in the supplementary
materials A. These texts were pre-tested regarding their understandability and
iteratively improved. One of our aims with the texts was to clearly emphasise
the unique selling proposition for smart homes in the one case and smart health
devices in the other.
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3.2 Country Selection
The participants of our study were inhabitants of Spain, Romania, and Ger-
many. The original concept included participants from Norway, which had to be
abandoned due to a lack of participants (see supplementary materials for more
details). Various factors led to the decision for the countries mentioned above.
First of all, most studies referring to privacy and security are conducted in the
US. In combination with the findings that national culture influences privacy and
security concerns studying European countries seemed as an obvious extension
of existing research. Studies concerning Internet privacy tend to split Europe
into four major parts – namely northern, central/western, eastern, and southern
Europe [6, 15]. This separation is based on cultural differences and equalities
as well as Internet usage. Therefore, we decided to include participants from
each of these major parts of Europe. Spain representing the Southern European
states, Romania representing the Eastern states, and Germany representing Cen-
tral/Western states. Norway would have been the representative for the Northern
part of Europe.
3.3 Study Procedure
We used a between-subject design, randomly assigning participants to one of
the considered technologies. All questionnaires were presented in participants’
native language (i.e., German, Romanian, and Spanish) and implemented in
SoSciSurvey [13]. The study procedure is:
Welcome and Informed Consent. We first thanked participants and pro-
vided them with information about our study (i.e., length, purpose, compensation,
anonymity of their data, opportunity to withdraw from participation at any time).
Participants were asked to provide their consent for participation and processing
of their data by clicking on a button which was labeled with ”I agree”.
Introduction of Smart Environment. Participants were randomly as-
signed to one of the smart environments which was introduced to them in a brief
descriptive text (see appendix A).
Open Question on Consequences of Smart Environment Usage. We
used an open answer format inspired by Harbach et al. [9] to ask participants
about possible consequences. In order to encourage the participants to list as
many consequences as they are aware of, the questionnaire included ten text boxes
and participants were instructed to enter one consequence per box, beginning with
the most severe one: “Please enter all the consequences that may arise when using
[smart home/health]. Please begin with the most severe possible consequence and
leave the additional boxes empty if you do not know any further consequences.”
Participants also had the opportunity to provide as many additional consequences
as they wanted in an extra text box at the end of the site.
Demographics and Thanks. At the end of the study, we asked the partici-
pants for demographic information. On the last page, we thanked the participants
and provided contact details in case any questions would occur as well as the
code they needed to receive their compensation from the panel.
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3.4 Recruitment and Participants
We recruited our participants using the European panel ”clickworker”4, which is
similar to Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk), but focuses on European users.
Participants received a compensation which corresponds to minimum wage
in the respective country at the time the survey 5 was conducted, i.e., 1.50e in
Germany and 0.80e in Spain. In Romania, we started with minimum wage, but
since we had trouble finding Romanian participants with this low payment, we
raised the compensation from 0.30 to 1e).
All relevant ethical preconditions given for research with personal data by our
universities’ ethics committee were met. On the start page, all participants were
informed about the purpose and procedure of the present study. Participants
had the option to withdraw at any point during the study without providing any
reason and we informed them that in this case all data collected so far would
be deleted. Participants were assured that their data would not be linked to
their identity and that the responses would only be used for study purposes.
Furthermore, we used SoSciSurvey [13] for the survey implementation, which
stores all data in Germany and is thus subject to strict EU data protection law.
3.5 Data Analysis
First, as the questionnaires were presented in the main language of each country,
the responses were cross translated, i.e., the responses were translated to English
and then back to the original language to ensure the quality of the translation.
Both translation processes were done by researchers who are used to work in a
bilingual environment. The translated responses were then analysed using three
rounds of coding.
In a first coding round, we used a closed coding approach, to identify those
responses related to privacy and/or security. To that end, two researchers inde-
pendently coded the responses. Differences in the codings were resolved using
codings from a third independent researcher with a majority decision. Responses
that were not clearly related to security and privacy were sorted out in this round
as well.
In a second coding round, we then further analysed the responses clearly
related to privacy and/or security. To that end, two researchers independently
reviewed a subset of the responses using an open coding methodology to create a
code book of security- and/or privacy-related themes from the responses. Open
coding is a bottom-up method to structure qualitative data, based on participants’
responses, rather than using pre-selected categories to code the responses. The
codes were then discussed between the two original and an additional researcher,
resulting in a final code book.
Using this process, a hierarchical code book arose, distinguishing between
abstract concerns (i.e. responses such as “security issues” that do not specify a
4 https://www.clickworker.com/, visited March 01, 2019
5 Which took, according to our pretests, about 10 minutes to complete.
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concrete result of a security and privacy violation), threats (i.e. responses such
as “data theft” that specify a security and privacy violation but not necessarily
mention a concrete harm resulting from it) and harms (i.e. responses that specify
the concrete effect on one’s well-being as a result of security and privacy violation,
e.g. “home burglary”). The complete code book including codes in these three
categories is provided in the supplementary materials (Appendix A.1). This code
book was then used in a third round of coding by the two original researchers to
perform selective coding of the responses.
All statistical analyses based on these three rounds of coding were conducted
using the R statistics software environment.
4 Results
A total of 596 participants completed our study. Of them, 21 were excluded from
further analysis because they provided at least one obvious nonsense-answer,
e.g., “ahdjhdg”. Out of the remaining 575 participants, 196 were from Germany,
185 from Romania and 196 from Spain. 206 participants reported to use their
assigned smart environment (i.e., smart home or smart health) often or sometimes.
Participants from age groups ”<20” to ”66–75” were represented in the sample,
with the majority of the participants being from the age group ”26–35”. Further
details on the demographics of the sample are provided in the supplementary
materials.
4.1 Total Responses
Overall, we analysed 1117 responses (excluding two duplicate responses)6. Of
them, 38 stated that the respective participants do not know any consequences
that could result from using smart environments. 387 responses (stated by 275
participants) described negative aspects of smart environment usage that clearly
referred to privacy and/or security issues (e.g, hacking or increased insurance
rates due to access to medical information). Out of the participants mentioning
at least one security and privacy issue, 147 were from Germany, 86 from Spain
and 42 from Romania; 164 of them were assigned the smart home scenario, and
111 the smart health scenario.
4.2 Security and Privacy Issues
We categorized the security and privacy issues named by the participants on
the three axes introduced in section 3.5, namely, whether the response describes
abstract concerns, threats, or the harm on themselves (see section 4.2). Of all the
participants mentioning at least one security and privacy issue, 111 mentioned
6 Note that as described in Section 3.3, each participant was encouraged to list as
many consequences as they could think of, having a total of 11 open questions which
they could fill in.
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only abstract concerns (of them, 43 participants from Germany, 46 from Spain and
22 from Romania; 72 assigned to smart home and 39 to smart health scenario),
34 mentioned at least one concrete harm (19 from Germany, 11 from Spain, 4
from Romania; 22 assigned to smart home and 12 to smart health scenario) and
130 mentioned at least one threat but no concrete harm (85 from Germany, 29
from Spain, 16 from Romania; 70 assigned to smart home and 60 to smart health
scenario).
Table 1. Number of participants mentioning “only abstract concerns”, “at least one
concrete harm”, “at least one threat but no concrete harm” (from left to right - Germany,
Romania, Spain, smart home, smart health).
Total
Only abstract concerns 43 46 22 72 39 111
At least one concrete harm 19 11 4 22 12 34
At least one threat but no concrete harm 85 29 16 70 60 130
Overall, more German participants named security and privacy issues than
Spanish or Romanian ones. The German participants also named threats more
Table 2. Number of participants mentioning each of the detailed security and privacy
issues (from left to right - Germany, Romania, Spain, smart home, smart health).
Total
Abstract concerns
Concerns about attacks 27 31 23 59 22 81
Concerns related to data abuse 17 3 0 7 13 20
General privacy concerns 33 22 4 38 21 59
General security concerns 11 9 3 17 6 23
Other 1 0 0 0 1 1
Threats
Being spied on 44 4 3 34 17 51
Manipulation of functionality 0 2 1 3 0 3
Data being shared 25 5 1 12 19 31
Data collection 27 6 4 24 13 37
Data theft 20 14 9 20 23 43
Profiling 9 3 0 7 5 12
Transparency 11 2 0 8 5 13
Other 0 1 0 1 0 1
Harms
Being blackmailed 2 0 1 2 1 3
Being influenced 3 4 0 4 3 7
Burglary 4 2 1 5 2 7
Financial loss 5 3 1 6 3 9
Health impairment 2 1 1 1 3 4
Identity theft 2 0 1 3 0 3
Other 2 1 0 1 2 3
Personalised ads 2 0 0 2 0 2
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often and were more likely to describe the harm on themselves than participants
from other countries. Moreover, German participants not only mentioned some-
what more security issues than Spanish participants, but also more of the German
participants mentioned more threats and described the harm on themselves. In
contrast, more of the Spanish answers described abstract concerns. Romanian
participants provided the least responses referring to each category of security
and privacy issues.
The most responses in the abstract concerns category described the possibility
of a cyber-attack, while at the same time the most of the concerns mentioned by
the German participants referred to privacy and data protection. The general
privacy concerns were also mentioned more prominently in the smart health
context than in relation to smart homes. Most of the responses mentioning
a threat referred to privacy-related issues as well, such as the possibility of
being monitored or spied on in one’s own home, one’s data being collected,
or information about oneself getting disclosed or passed on to somebody else.
The responses in the smart health context furthermore focused more on data
being shared with third parties or stolen via unauthorised access, compared to
the smart home context that focused on data collection or overall surveillance.
Although only very few participants described the harm from the consequences
that could result from living in smart environments on themselves, those who did,
mostly named financial loss as both direct (e.g. via unauthorised access to one’s
financial accounts) and indirect (e.g. as increased insurance rates due to leakage
of personal data), burglary due to both access to one’s security system as well as
to private information about when one is (not) at home and the possibility of
being influenced in one’s opinion or behavior.
4.3 Statistical Analysis
In order to investigate the differences in security and privacy risk perception
among the participants in our sample, we looked at the awareness of security-
and privacy risks, which we measured as a binary outcome, whether a participant
mentioned at least one security- or privacy-related issue. In addition to looking
at country of the participant and the smart environment to which they were
assigned, we included age, gender and their smart environment usage (as actual
users, potential users or non-users) as predictor variables. The logistic regression
analysis has shown the country of the participant, the smart environment (either
smart home or smart health) to be a significant factor (p < .001), as well as,
to a lesser extent, smart environment usage (p = .003) and age (p = .036)
(see the ouput of the analysis in the supplementary materials). The gender of
the participant was not shown to be significant (p > .05). The post-hoc tests
furthermore have shown significant differences between all the three countries
(p < .001), with participants from Germany naming security and privacy issues
most frequently, followed by Spain and Romania. Significantly more participants
mentioned security and privacy issues for smart homes than for smart health
devices, and significantly more potential than actual smart home and smart
health users named security and privacy issues (p = .002).
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5 Discussion
Several limitations apply to our study. Firstly, we chose a survey design, which
prevented us from asking participants to further explain their answers if the
meaning was unclear to us. Thus, some responses may have been related to
security and privacy issues but were not considered in our final analysis. However,
this study design allows us to compare the responses from a large sample of
participants from three different countries, which would not have been possible
with an interview study design. Furthermore, as we used a panel for recruitment,
our sample might be biased in terms of age, academic background and techni-
cal expertise. However, if even younger, well-educated and tech-savvy people
lack awareness of security and privacy issues associated with living in smart
environments, the problems faced by the rest of the population might be even
bigger.
Less than a half of the participants in our study mentioned at least one
security or privacy-related issue of smart home usage, indicating that while there
is some degree of awareness of these issues, for many users this awareness is still
lacking. Our study furthermore shows that there are indeed differences between
countries in terms of awareness about security and privacy risks. This might have
an impact on data protection regulations and the success of their implementation
and enforcement, especially if one aims to implement these on a global level given
the cross-border nature of Internet-based services. Furthermore, as social factors
are commonly recognized to play a role in the security and privacy behaviour
of end users (e.g. resulting in reluctance to use security- and privacy-enhancing
tools due to the fear of appearing overly paranoid, see e.g. [22]), it is worth
investigating, how the different degree of awareness of security and privacy risks
in various countries should be considered in developing security and privacy
protection support methods.
The participants furthermore named security and privacy consequences of
using smart health devices less often. When it comes to the differences in specific
consequences, several differences between the two smart environments occur. As
such, codes that imply transferring the data into the hands of third parties are
mentioned more frequently in the context of smart homes than smart health. On
the other hand, the issues mentioning data collection without referring to further
sharing of the data are more prominently featured in the smart home context.
A possible explanation is that while the participants understand the sensitivity
of data collected by smart health devices, they are more likely to perceive the
entity collecting the data as trustworthy (e.g., when consulting a physician) and
therefore be more concerned about repurposing the data by other entities. As
researchers stress the importance of context in determining privacy issues (see e.
g. [3,16]), our findings provide a further confirmation for this approach, indicating
the need to consider both cultural factors and context of a specific system or
data exchange in order to support the end users with their security and privacy
protection.
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The following code book was used to analyse the responses in the survey. The
responses could be assigned multiple codes as follows. If multiple abstract concerns,
but no concrete issues (that is, no threats or harms) were named in a response,
the respective codes were simply assigned to the responses. However, if codes
from both, the concrete and the abstract categories would have been coded in
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a response, only the concrete codes were assigned, since the response specifies
either the threat or the harm related to the concern, hence, it is no longer seen
as abstract.
Abstract concerns The response mentions an abstract concern, without speci-
fying either the threat that the adversary poses or the concrete harm that can
result from the threat.
– General security concerns
• Description: The response explicitly mentions security
• Example: “security issues”
– General privacy concerns
• Description: The response explicitly mentions privacy or data protection
• Example: “Lack of privacy”
– Concerns related to data abuse
• Description: The response explicitly mentions misuse or abuse of data
• Example: “Possible misuse of personal data”
– Concerns about attacks
• Description: The response explicitly mentions hackers or cyber-attacks.
• Example: “They could hack into my data”
Threats The response a specific way one’s security and privacy might be violated,
without also necessarily mentioning the concrete harm a violation might cause.
– Data theft
• Description: The response explicitly mentions data theft or someone
stealing the data, or otherwise makes clear that the issue is with non-legal
means of getting access to the data
• Example: “If my data is stolen”
– Manipulation of functionality
• Description: The response describes how unauthorised access or control
to the system interferes with the functioning of the system.
• Example: “Deactivation of the burglar alarm”
– Data collection
• Description: The response mentions data being collected and stored
• Example: “Smart home appliances collect information”
– Being spied on
• Description: The response explicitly mentions spying, surveillance, moni-
toring or eavesdropping, or otherwise makes clear that the issue is about
external observation of some kind
• Example: “increased risk of monitoring in the personal environment”
– Being transparent
• Description: The response explicitly mentions transparency (in a sense of
users of smart environment being transparent to observation) or otherwise
makes clear that the issue is about being totally exposed (as opposed to
the codes “Data collection” or “Being spied on” where there is no such
focus on total character of the exposure)
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• Example: “My way of life would not be private, but would be almost
anytime x-rayed”
– Profiling
• Description: The response explicitly mentions profiling or analysis or
otherwise makese clear that the collected data is further processed
• Example: “A profile is created which allows conclusions about my person”
– Data being shared
• Description: The response makes clear that the collected data is shared
with others, also referring to legal transfer to third parties.
• Example: “Transmission of my data not only to the doctor, but also to
the health insurance company”
Harms The response mentions an impact on one’s well-being that is the result
of a security and privacy violation.
– Burglary
• Description: The response mentions being robbed as either the result of
manipulating the smart system or by learning the habits of the household
members (i.e. times when no one is at home)
• Example: “Being connected to the internet, intelligent devices can be
hacked and can indicate whether they are at home or not, then causing
a break”
– Financial loss
• Description: The response mentions financial loss, either direct (e.g.
someone hacking into one’s financial accounts) or indirect (e.g. insurance
companies raising rates as the result of access to one’s health data)
• Example: “Automated internet-connected systems can be remotely ac-
cessed by unauthorized people who could steal any amount from the
user’s account”
– Being blackmailed
• Description: The response mentions blackmail, either via controlling the
smart home or threatening to expose sensitive information leaked from
the smart system.
• Example: “Takeover of the flat / the house by hackers for the purpose of
extortion”
– Personalised ads
• Description: The response mentions being targetted with personalised
ads
• Example: “My personal data is recorded in detail. As a consequence I
will be targeted with ‘tailored’ advertisements”
– Being influenced
• Description: The response mentions decision or opinion manipulation as
the result of access to data
• Example: “That companies get too much information about my prefer-
ences and use it to try to modify my opinions or habits, as has happened
with Facebook and Trump”
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– Health impairment
• Description: The response mentions using smart health devices to harm
one’s health
• Example: “Someone hack into your service and cause you a serious health
problem by sending false information”
– Identity theft
• Description: The response mentions identity theft or fraud as the result
of access to personal data
• Example: “Theft of identity”
A.2 Description of Smart Environments as stated in the
questionnaire
Smart Home Smart home refers to a household in which household appliances
(e.g., refrigerator, washing machine, vacuum cleaner), integrated devices (e.g.
lights, windows, heating), and entertainment electronics (e.g., TV, voice assist,
game consoles) are networked and can be controlled via the Internet.
This new technology delivers several conveniences:
– Increased quality of life e.g. concerning the refrigerator by detecting low
supplies of important products and automatic ordering of these
– Building protection e.g. concerning lights by individual profiles for switching
on and off
– Simplified ordering processes e.g instructing voice assistants such as Alexa
via simple verbal orders
Smart Health Smart health describes a household in which health equipment
(e.g. blood pressure monitor, scales, thermometer), special sensors (e.g., drop
sensors, sensors in the toilette, heat sensors), and wearables (e.g. smartwatches,
fitness trackers or smartphones) are connected.
This new technology delivers several conveniences:
– Improved information for doctors, e.g., blood pressure measuring instruments
reporting and transmitting regular measurements
– Improved emergency response, e.g., drop detectors sending a direct emergency
message to the rescue service
– Improved health, e.g., fitness trackers analyzing your sleep patterns
A.3 Questionnaire
Do you use smart home devices (e.g. refrigerator, automated light, voice assistants
like alexa connected to the internet)/smart health devices (e.g. blood pressure
measuring devices, case sensors, fitness tracker connected to the internet)?
Yes, I often use use smart home devices/smart health devices.
Yes, I sometimes use use smart home devices/smart health devices.
I do not use smart home devices/smart health devices, but I would like to use
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them in the future.
I do not use social networks/use smart home devices/smart health devices and I
do not want to use them in the future.
Please enter all the consequences that may arise from using [smart home/health].
Please begin with the most severe possible consequence and leave the additional
boxes empty if you do not know any further consequences.
Gender: m / f / other
Age:
<20, 20-25, 26-35, 36-45, 46-55, 56-65, 66-75, 76-85, >85
A.4 Demographics of the sample
The following tables describe the demographics of our sample (excluding the
participants who provided nonsense answers) in terms of age, gender and smart
environment usage distributed between the three countries and the two smart
environments.
Table 3. Demographics from left to right - Germany, Romania, Spain, smart
home/health.
Total
Female 88 61 97 123 123 246
Male 108 124 97 182 147 329
<20 11 50 14 43 32 75
20–25 28 56 56 77 63 140
26–35 65 59 55 98 81 179
36–45 33 14 57 49 55 104
46–55 36 5 9 26 24 50
56–65 20 1 2 11 12 23
66–75 3 - 1 1 3 4
Table 4. Usage frequency of smart environments from left to right - Germany, Romania,
Spain, smart home/health.
Total
Often 27 24 31 48 34 82
Sometimes 32 34 58 55 69 124
Never, but I would like to in the future 88 109 89 169 117 288
Never, and I would not like to in the future 49 18 16 33 50 83
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We also aimed to include Norwegian participants in our study, but had trouble
recruiting them. Initially, we chose the clickworker panel since they assured us to
have a large enough user base in all four countries considered in our study. We
started to recruit with minimum wage (3e) in Norway, but after a month only
17 participants had completed the questionnaire, compared to less than one week
in Germany and Spain. We thus raised the compensation to 4.50e, which lead
to another 73 completed questionnaires after 2,5 month. Since the Norwegian
sample was still too small compared to the other samples, we asked several
Scandinavian researchers for their advice. Unfortunately, none of them was aware
of a platform like MTurk reaching Norwegians; also searching in Norwegian it
was not possible to find an alternative Scandinavian panel (via internet and
by asking other research colleagues). The contacted researchers further told us
that finding Scandinavian participants for studies is a well-known problem, as
most Scandinavians are not interested in participating in research studies for a
small or moderate compensation, and Scandinavian researchers thus often rely
on students or use foreign panels like MTurk. Finally, we decided not to include
the 90 Scandinavian participants in our analysis, due to the small sample size,
the long recruiting period and the Scandinavian researchers’ experience with
recruitment, all of which lead us to worry about the 90 participants in our sample
being hardly representative for the Norwegian population.
A.5 Output of the statistical analysis
The following tables describe the results of the statistical analysis, investigating
the effect of country of the participant, the smart environment they were assigned
to, their usage habits of smart environment and their age and gender on security
and privacy awareness, measured as naming at least one security and privacy
issue.
Table 5. Analysis of deviance output for whether a participant named at least one
security or privacy issue (factors ordered by p-value)
LR Chisq Df Pr(>Chisq)
country 108.54 2 0.0000
environment 12.63 1 0.0004
user 11.50 2 0.0032
age 13.43 6 0.0367
gender 0.49 1 0.4828
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Table 6. Post-hoc tests for comparison between the countries
contrast estimate SE df z.ratio p.value
DE - RO 2.7108 0.2903 Inf 9.336 <.0001
DE - ESP 1.4535 0.2528 Inf 5.749 <.0001
RO - ESP -1.2573 0.2574 Inf -4.884 <.0001
Results are given on the log odds ratio (not the response) scale.
Table 7. Post-hoc tests for comparison between the usage habits
contrast estimate SE df z.ratio p.value
non-user - potential user -0.2432 0.3033 Inf -0.802 0.4225
non-user - user 0.4853 0.3181 Inf 1.526 0.1271
potential user - user 0.7286 0.2179 Inf 3.343 0.0008
Results are given on the log odds ratio (not the response) scale.
